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1. Introduction
In many legal settings, negotiations over the level of the penalty are allowed to take
place between the law enforcer and indicted individuals. The negotiation typically
ends up with a guilty plea for criminal cases and a settlement for civil cases: in both
cases, the o®ender agrees to be in°icted a certain sanction so as to avoid a regular
trial. The negotiated enforcement of law is an extremely widespread practice, and
targets the objective of preserving the economic resources that would be wasted for
costly investigations. Its social desirability, however, is quite controversial, and has
been objected by many legal scholars.1
A strong argument in favour of pre-trial negotiations comes from the literature
on law and economics, which recognizes that they reduce the conviction costs and
produce an e±ciency gain. The core of this argument can be found in Grossman and
Katz (1983) and can be stated in the following terms: settlements, as well as plea
bargains, allow guilty agents (who accept the settlement o®er) to separate themselves
from innocent ones (who reject the o®er), with the e®ect of reducing the overall
conviction costs. In other words, settlements act as a screening device, providing a
quick and almost free conviction of the defendants who would otherwise be bound to
lose their case.
On the negative side, it has been pointed out that settlements may provide in-
dicted agents with unnecessary bargaining power, which allows them to net a dis-
count on the due penalty. In turn, this lowers the expected sanction for o®enders
and induces more frequent violations. The latter argument depends strongly on the
assumption that the indicted has some bargaining power at the settlement stage, and
that he can compel the enforcer to agree on a settlement amount which is less than
the statutory penalty for the infraction at hand.
In this paper, we provide a di®erent explanation to the fact that settlements
usually allow guilty o®ender to get away with a signi¯cantly reduced payment. We
assume, as it is often the case, that the indicted has no bargaining power, and that
the settlement o®er is made on a take-it-or-leave-it base by the enforcer. The reason
why settlements involve amounts lower than the statutory penalty has to be identi-
¯ed with the fact that the enforcer cannot commit itself to put full e®ort into the
case after a failure to settle. This, in turn, occurs since the enforcer su®ers from im-
perfect information at the settlement stage (he does not know whether the indicted
is innocent or guilty) and the elimination of this uncertainty (by means of a thor-
ough investigation) is costly. Hence, the enforcer may not be able to threaten a sure
conviction to those who refuse to accept his o®er, and the di®erent types of agents
(guilty and innocent) do not fully separate at the settlement stage. In general, if
the enforcer wants his o®er to be accepted with a larger probability, he will have to
1A good introduction to the debate on the impact of pre-trial bargains on the legal system can
be found in the 1991 issue of the Yale Law Journal.
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content himself with a low settlement amount.2
In our model, the terms of the enforcement process depend on the will of di®erent
institutions/individuals involved in it at di®erent times. We assume that the enforce-
ment agency is two-tiered; on the ¯rst tier, we have a legislature which decides the
level of the penalty for convicted o®enders, on the second, we have an independent
investigation branch (\the enforcer"), whose aim is to discover whether the indicted
is guilty or innocent with respect to a speci¯c infraction. The two branches of the
agency enter the enforcement process at di®erent stages; the legislature decides the
penalty at the outset, the enforcer decides which e®ort to devote to the investigation
after the violation, if any, has been perpetrated. As in many real situations, the
viewpoint of the enforcer is a typical ex-post perspective, in which the attention is
focused on the cost-e®ective conviction of guilty o®enders rather than the deterrence
e®ect on crime. The legislature, on the other hand, takes an ex-ante perspective,
and selects the penalty level that minimizes the social loss (expected harm minus net
recovery) associated with the potential o®ense.
The main conclusion of this paper is that pre-investigation settlements play a
double role in the enforcement process. On the one hand, they allow the enforcer to
e®ectively reduce enforcement costs: if the settlement o®er is accepted, the enforcer
collects a settlement amount without having to prove the guilt of the defendant. On
the other hand, however, the screening out of guilty defendants operated at the ne-
gotiation stage induces an overall weakening of the deterrent power of enforcement
policy, because it reduces the incentives for the enforcer to carry out thorough investi-
gations after a failure to settle. As a consequence, the introduction of the settlement
stage increases both the ex-post net recovery from possibly guilty agents and the level
of crime. These two factors a®ect social welfare in opposing ways. Which of the two
e®ects dominates depends on the ratio between the level of the harm associated with
the crime and the amount of resources that can be extracted from the o®ender at the
settlement stage.
An in-depth account of the credibility constraint hanging over the enforcement
process allows us to identify new factors relevant to determining the optimal penalty.
In particular, we will provide an alternative justi¯cation to the commonly observed
lack of the maximal sanctions which are recommended by deterrence theory. While
the \Principle of Maximum Deterrence" states that the optimal penalty is maximal
whenever penalties can be in°icted without costs, in the real world, sanctions are
rarely set to their maximum level, even when this is ¯nite, i.e., when limited liability
applies.3 Our way of reconciling theory and evidence is rather intuitive; when the level
2The problem of the credibility of settlement o®ers has been forcefully raised by Nalebu® (1987) in
a model involving civil suits. In Nalebu®'s model, the plainti® has imperfect information about the
true liability of the defendant and makes a settlement o®er prior to the trial. The credibility problem
arises because the plainti® may be tempted to drop the case if a settlement is not reached. Nalebu®
limits his analysis to the settlement stage, and does not consider the impact of the negotiation on
the production of harm.
3The optimality of a maximal penalty is derived and discussed in the early works of Becker
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of harm associated with the crime is relatively small relative to the private bene¯t
that the criminal gets from it, it may be socially desirable to let the agent engage in
crime so as to reduce the uncertainty su®ered by the enforcer at the settlement stage
and obtain the largest bene¯ts form the negotiation.
The explicit consideration of the ex-ante e®ects of pre-trial negotiations on the
production of crime distinguishes this contribution to most of the other works on
settlements. The standard view is to take the probability that a crime has been
committed as given, and to study the e®ects of settlements on the distribution of
the legal and investigative costs.4 A work related to ours is Polinsky and Rubinfeld
(1988), which analyses the desirability of settlements in a simple model of harm
prevention. In their model, the parties enjoy perfect information about the level of
harm caused by accidents. As a consequence, trials entail pure \transaction costs."
They assume that both parties held some bargaining power at the negotiation stage
and that settlements reduce the expected cost of an accident for the injurer. Under
these conditions, trials are socially desirable only if settlements do not provide the
potential injurer with adequate incentives to care. In Franzoni (1995), a model of
tax enforcement is developed in which the tax agency can precommit itself to the
audit policy, and uses it to extract a settlement amount from taxpayers. Settlements
represent here a form of \renegotiation" of the original enforcement policy, which
proves to increase the payo® to the agency when the original policy is not optimally
chosen.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model and derive
the equilibrium of the game between the agent and the enforcer. The game is solved
backwards from the settlement stage. This allows us to derive a theory of settlements,
which is of interest in itself. In section 3, we characterize the optimal penalty and
discuss the relation between our result and the Principle of Maximum Deterrence.
In section 4, we discuss the desirability of the settlement stage by contrasting the
outcome of our game with the outcome of a game in which negotiations cannot take
place between the enforcer and the individual. In section 5, the model is extended
so as to give account of a variable probability of indictment, a variable bene¯t from
noncompliance and a variable penalty. Finally, section 6 provides a brief summary
and some concluding remarks.
2. The enforcement game
The problem we are going to consider relates to the enforcement of a speci¯c law
or regulation, which requires the agent to behave in a speci¯ed manner or to refrain
from taking a certain action. For example, environmental regulations might require
that ¯rms refrain from using polluting production processes, ¯scal regulations that
(1968), Kolm (1973), and Mirrlees (1974). Other contributions include Polinsky and Shavell (1979),
Nalebu® and Sharfstein (1987), Shavell (1991) and Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1993).
4See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) for a good survey of the literature. Recent contributions
include, among others, Reinganum and Wilde (1987), Reinganum (1988) and Daughety and Rein-
ganum (1993).
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taxpayers keep their accounts in a speci¯c way, etc. If the agent does not abide by
his obligation, (social) harm of amount H is produced. Our emphasis is on crimes of
economic nature, where rationality of both parties, the agent and the enforcer, can
be reasonably assumed.
We assume that the agent can be of two types: honest or opportunistic. The
honest type abides by his obligation out of respect for his ethical code, while the op-
portunistic type rationally assesses the costs and bene¯ts of compliance, and complies
only if the expected penalty is larger than his individual gain from noncompliance.
The opportunistic agent maximizes a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and
is neutral towards risk. For the honest type, the bene¯t from noncompliance is 0 (or
negative), while for the opportunistic it is equal to T: The probability that the agent
is honest is p: The reason why the opportunistic agent may decide to comply is that
he may incur the risk of an investigation. This investigation can take the form of
statistical testing in the case of pollution control, an audit in the case of tax infrac-
tions, and the reconstruction of the events in the case of generic crimes and frauds.
If the investigation shows that the agent has defected, he has to pay a penalty in the
amount F:
We assume that the investigation process is triggered by a random event (signal),
which might be tied up with the behaviour of the agent. For the time being, however,
we assume that this event is independent of the agent's choice and occurs with a
constant probability ¼: In section 5, we will extend our model to the more realistic case
in which the probability of an investigation is larger when the agent is noncompliant.
Before the investigation is actually began, the agent and the enforcer (i.e. the
administrative branch in charge of the discovery of the truth and the conviction of
guilty agents) can strike a deal; the agent can plead guilty and accept to pay the set-
tlement amount decided by the enforcer. If the settlement o®er made by the enforcer
is rejected, the investigation takes place. Depending on how much e®ort the enforcer
puts into the process, the investigation may reach di®erent levels of accuracy. We
assume that conviction can be obtained only in the presence of hard incriminatory
evidence, i.e. evidence which proves without doubt the guilt of the defendant. Let a
be the probability of conviction of a guilty agent subject to the investigation (a mea-
sures the accuracy of the investigation). Since a larger investigative e®ort produces
a greater accuracy, we can express the enforcer's problem as the choice of the appro-
priate level of accuracy for the case at hand. The enforcer's goal is not to produce
deterrence, but to recover the penalty with the lowest e®ort from a possibly guilty
agent. In other words, the enforcer maximizes the expected net transfer from the
agent. For simplicity, we assume that investigation costs are a quadratic function of
the probability of conviction; C (a) = 1
2
c a2: The enforcer maximizes the net recovery
taking the penalty level and the noncompliance probability as given.
The penalty level is decided by the \the principal" (the legislature), whose ob-
jective is ex-ante optimality. It will choose F so as to minimize the social loss from
noncompliance, i.e. the di®erence between the expected level of harm and the ex-
pected net recovery from the agent. The principal decides the penalty at the outset,
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and is aware of the way in which it a®ects the game between the enforcer and the
agent.
The move sequence of the game is the following;
1. the principal decides the penalty level,
2. the agent decides whether to comply or not,
3. depending on an random signal, the agent may be selected for an investigation,
4. the indicted agent is o®ered a take-it-or-leave-it settlement o®er by the enforcer,
5. the agent chooses whether to accept the o®er or not,
6. if the o®er is rejected, the enforcer carries out the investigation. It chooses the
e®ort to devote to the case and the resulting conviction probability.
We solve the game by backward induction using the concept of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. In simple terms, a PBE is a set of strategies and beliefs such that, at
any stage of the game, strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are
obtained from equilibrium strategies and observed actions using Bayes' rule. We solve
the game backwards, considering the optimal settlement o®er ¯rst.
The optimal settlement o®er
In this section, we derive the optimal settlement o®er for any given probability of
guilt of the agent. We are therefore solving the last three stages of the game. Our
objective is to show that the optimal settlement o®er will depend on the conviction
rate that the enforcer can credibly threaten. Given that the payment of the agent is
F in case of conviction and 0 in case of acquittal, the optimal settlement o®er will
be q¤ = a¤F ; with a¤ equal to the credible conviction threat. In order to derive the
optimal settlement amount, the enforcer has to calculate the continuation equilibrium
following each possible settlement amount q:
We start our analysis by considering the equilibrium of the continuation game
(following the settlement o®er). We derive the optimal behaviour of the defendant
¯rst. The agent only knows whether he is innocent or guilty, while the enforcer
believes the agent to be guilty with probability x: The strategy of the agent will
depend on whether he is guilty or not. Clearly, an innocent defendant will reject all
settlement o®ers with q > 0: A guilty defendant will instead reject the o®er only if
the expected payment in case of rejection (probability of conviction £penalty) is less
that q: Let ½ (a j q) be the probability that the guilty defendant rejects an o®er of
amount q when the expected conviction probability is a: We have8><
>:
½ (a j q) = 1 if q > aF;
½ (a j q) 2 [0; 1] if q = aF;
½ (a j q) = 0 if q < aF;
(1)
Consider now the enforcer's optimal choice in case of rejection. It will choose the con-
viction probability a (through her investigation e®ort) which maximizes the expected
net recovery. The latter is calculated through her revised belief about the probability
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of guilt of the agent,
R (a) =
½ x
½ x+ 1 ¡ xaF ¡
1
2
ca2:
The enforcer knows that only the guilty defendant may be willing to accept the
settlement o®er. If the o®er is rejected, the enforcer will attach a larger probability
to the defendant being innocent rather than guilty. This in turn reduces the incentives
to carry out thorough investigations. The optimal conviction probability is
a (½ j x) =
8>><
>>:
½ x
[½ x+ 1¡ x]
F
c
if
½ x
[½ x+ 1¡ x]
F
c
· 1;
1 otherwise.
(2)
The conviction probability is larger if the likelihood that the agent is guilty is larger.
If the recoverable ¯ne is far greater than the investigation costs, the enforcer can
credibly threaten a (½ j x) = 1:
Figure 1 depicts the best reply functions of the enforcer and the guilty agent.
Figure 1: Optimal rejection probability for the guilty agent and optimal conviction
probability.
Let us assume that F < c; so that a (½ j x) is always less than one at the
equilibrium, and leave the other case to the appendix. The equilibrium following
the settlement o®er q is obtained combining eqs. (1) and (2), and depends on the
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level of q as follows;
continuation
equilibrium,
8>>><
>>>:
a (q j x) = q
F
; and ½ (q j x) = 1¡x
x
1
(Fc
F
q
¡1); if q · x
F 2
c
;
a (q j x) = xF
c
; and ½ (q j x) = 1; if q > xF 2
c
:
(3)
If the settlement amount is not too high, 0 < q · xF 2
c
; then at the equilibrium the
guilty agent rejects the o®er with a probability ½ (q j x) which is larger if the enforcer
demands a larger settlement amount; @½
@q
> 0.5 At the equilibrium, the probability
of conviction of the guilty agent in case of rejection is such as to render the agent
indi®erent between accepting and rejecting the o®er; a (q j x) = q=F: As expected,
investigations are less thorough if they follow the rejection of a settlement o®er with
a small amount. The rejection of the o®er provides the enforcer with bad news about
the probability of getting a conviction: the smaller the settlement o®er which is
turned down and the more likely it is that the defendant is innocent.
Note also that the probability that the guilty defendant accepts the settlement
o®er is larger if the probability of guilt, x; is larger. This because a larger proba-
bility of guilt relaxes the credibility constraint on the conviction threat by making
investigations more pro¯table. If x goes to one (the agent is guilty with certainty),
the rejection probability goes to zero. This is an interesting result, which will have
important consequences for the optimal enforcement policy. One can start to see
that if one of the objectives of the principal is to limit enforcement costs, then a
large defection rate may have desirable consequences, since it reduces the credibility
constraint on the conviction threat and makes a settlement more likely.
If the settlement amount is very large, q > x F
2
c
; then both types reject the of-
fer with probability one, and the probability of conviction of the guilty agent is the
largest credible one; a (q j x) = xF
c
: In this case, the rejection does not convey any
information to the enforcer and the continuation equilibrium is independent of q:
We can now turn to the problem of the optimal settlement o®er. The expected
net recovery following an o®er of amount q is
R (q j x) =x (1 ¡ ½ (q j x)) q| {z }
exp. settlement intake
+ x½ (q j x) a (q j x)F| {z }
exp. penalty intake
¡ 1
2
[1 ¡ x (1 ¡ ½ (q j x))] c [a (q j x)]2| {z }
exp. investigation costs
An increase in the settlement amount a®ects the net recovery in several ways: ¯rst, it
increases the amount collected in case of acceptance; second, it reduces the probability
5Note that this result is brought about by the convexity of the investigation cost function. In
a linear model, with C (a) = ca; the rejection probability would be independent of the settlement
amount, since only one level of ½ would allow the inspector to select a conviction probability di®erent
from 0 or 1. Here, instead, di®erent rejection rates lead to di®erent conviction probabilities; large
rejection probabilities are associated with large conviction rates and, consequently, large settlement
amounts.
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that the o®er is accepted; third, it increases the optimal conviction rate in case of
rejection (which is larger, the higher the probability that the guilty agent rejects the
o®er).
Using the equilibrium values just obtained, we get
R (q j x) =
8>>><
>>:
x q + 1
2
(1¡ x)
·
1 + 1
(Fc
F
q
¡1)
¸
c
³
q
F
´2
; for q · xF 2
c
;
x F
³
xF
c
´
¡ 1
2
c
³
xF
c
´2
; for q > xF
2
c
:
For q > xF 2=c; the expected net recovery is independent of q: large settlement o®ers
are rejected out of hand.
From the previous equation, one gets
R 0 (q j x) =
8<
: x¡ (1 ¡ x)
1
2
c 2F
2q¡cq2
(F 2¡cq)2 ; for q · xF
2
c
;
0; for q > xF
2
c
;
with R00 (q j x) · 0 throughout. Since R0 (0 j x) > 0 andR0
³
F 2
c
x j x
´
< 0; the optimal
q will belong to the interval
³
0; F
2
c
x
´
: (For q = 0, the net recovery is obviously 0). The
expected net recovery reaches its maximum when R0 (q j x) = 0 and R00 (q j x) < 0;
that is when
q (x) ´ F
2
c
Ã
1 ¡
p
1 ¡ xp
1 + x
!
:
The optimal settlement o®er q (x) is larger if the net pro¯tability of the investigation
is larger (larger F and x; and smaller c). If the agent is certainly innocent, x = 0;
then the optimal amount is zero. If the agent is certainly guilty, x = 1; then the
optimal amount is q (1) = F 2=c (which is the largest credible settlement o®er).
In the appendix, we derive the optimal settlement amount for the case with F > c:
In this case, for defection probabilities greater than the threshold ¹x; the continuation
equilibrium has a (q j x) = 1; where ¹x is de¯ned as follows
¹x ´ 1 ¡
³
F¡c
F
´2
1 +
³
F¡c
F
´2 :
Our results are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal settlement offer
Let x be the probability that the individual is guilty and let x be common knowl-
edge.
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1. If F · c; the optimal settlement o®er is q¤ (x) = F 2
c
³
1¡
p
1¡xp
1+x
´
: This o®er is
rejected with probability ½ (x) =
p
1¡x2¡(1¡x)
x
by a guilty agent and probability one
by an innocent agent. The conviction probability for a guilty agent who rejects the
o®er is a (x) = F
c
³
1¡
p
1¡xp
1+x
´
:
2. If F > c; we have two possible cases. If x · ¹x; the optimal o®er and the
continuation equilibrium are the same as in point 1. If x > ¹x; the optimal settlement
o®er is q¤ (x)= F: This o®er is rejected with probability ½ (x) = 1¡x
x
1
(Fc ¡1)
by a guilty
agent and probability one by an innocent agent. The conviction probability for a
guilty agent who rejects the o®er is a (x) = 1.
There are several interesting aspects of this result that need to be emphasized.
First, when the net recovery from the investigation is not too large (F · c or
x · ¹x); the optimal settlement o®er is strictly increasing in the probability of guilt x:
large defection probabilities make the investigation more remunerative and weaken
the credibility constraint on the conviction threat. In turn, the guilty type is lead
to reject the settlement o®er with a smaller probability. The probability that a
settlement is reached upon indictment is
Pr(sett.) = x (1¡ ½ (q)) = 1¡
q
1 ¡ x2;
which is strictly increasing in the probability of guilt x: The settlement o®er is ac-
cepted with certainty only if the agent cannot be or pretend to be innocent.
Second, if net return from the investigation is large (F > c and x > ¹x), the
enforcer can threaten the defendant with a sure conviction (a = 1) : In this case, the
credibility constraint does not bind, and the enforcer can ask for a settlement amount
equal to the full penalty. The probability of a settlement is
Pr(sett.) = x (1¡ ½ (q)) = Fx¡ c
F ¡ c ;
which is also strictly increasing in x:
The previous considerations show that pre-conviction negotiations are more ef-
fective (i.e. more likely to lead to a settlement) when the probability of guilt of the
agent is larger. In order to increase the e±ciency of the settlement stage, one would
therefore have to raise the noncompliance probability. This fact illustrates the typi-
cal trade-o® arising in the enforcement policy, where ex-post e±ciency can often be
reached only at the expense of ex-ante deterrence.
Ex-post settlement and noncompliance
Proposition 1 fully characterizes the optimal settlement o®er for the enforcer given
her belief about the probability of noncompliance. We can now ¯nd the solution of
the enforcement game and consider how the probability of noncompliance is a®ected
by the expected settlement o®er. Recall that the penalty is taken as given by the
players (the agent and the enforcer).
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Let ¯ be the probability that the opportunistic agent is noncompliant. The prob-
ability that the indicted agent is guilty when the settlement is proposed is then
x = (1¡ p)¯: For any expected settlement amount q, the opportunist will choose to
comply only if the expected payment in case of indictment is greater than his direct
gain from noncompliance. In other terms,
¯ (q) = 0 only if T · ¼ ((1¡ ½ (q)) q + ½ (q) a (q)F ) ;
where ½ (q) is the equilibrium probability that he rejects an o®er of amount q and
a (q) is the equilibrium probability of conviction in case of rejection. Since in any
continuation equilibrium q (q) =a (q) = F; we have8><
>:
¯ (q) = 0 if q > T=¼;
¯ (q) 2 (0; 1) if q = T=¼;
¯ (q) = 1 if q < T=¼:
We can ¯nally derive the solution of the game. The equilibrium will be charac-
terized by the levels of q and ¯ that allow each player to play his/her best reply. The
best reply functions are depicted in ¯gure 2.
Figure 2: Optimal noncompliance probability of the opportunistic agent and optimal
settlement amount.
The nature of the equilibrium will depend on whether q (1) and F are greater
or less than T=¼ (note that q is now written as a function of ¯): If F < T=¼; the
enforcer cannot possibly prevent the opportunistic agent from defecting: even if he
were convicted with certainty upon indictment, he would face an expected penalty less
than his gain from noncompliance. In this case, the equilibrium settlement amount
will depend on whether \a · 1" is binding or not. In order to ease the presentation,
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we assume here that the enforcement costs are high enough for \a · 1" not to be
binding at the equilibrium. In other terms, we assume that
c >
T
¼
(1¡ P ) ;
with P ´ q p
2¡p: The opposite case, with c <
T
¼
(1¡ P ) ; does not present special
di±culties and is dealt with in the appendix.
The most interesting case has F > T=¼: Here, the equilibrium can be either
internal or on the corner depending on whether q (1) is greater or less than T=¼: We
have q (1) > T=¼ if an only if ¿ < 1 ¡ P; with
¿ ´ T
¼ F F
c
:
The variable ¿; which will be extensively used hereafter, is equal to the ratio between
the private bene¯t from noncompliance and the largest credible expected punishment
(which is in°icted when the agent is guilty with probability one).
The following proposition describes the equilibrium of the game on the assumption
that \a · 1" in not binding.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium of the enforcement game
1. If ¿ < 1 ¡ P (large penalty), the opportunistic agent is noncompliant with
probability ¯¤ = 1
1¡p
1¡(1¡¿)2
1+(1¡¿)2 and the enforcer asks for a settlement amount q
¤ = T
¼
.
The compliant agent rejects the settlement o®er with probability one, while the non-
compliant agent rejects it with probability ½¤ = 1¡¿
1¡1=2 ¿ : The probability of conviction
of the noncompliant agent in case of rejection is a¤ = T
¼F
:
2. If ¿ > 1 ¡ P (small penalty), the opportunistic agent is noncompliant with
probability ¯¤ = 1 and the enforcer asks for a settlement amount q¤ = F
2
c
(1¡ P ) :
The compliant agent rejects the settlement o®er with probability one, while the non-
compliant agent rejects it with probability ½¤ = 2P
1+P
: The probability of conviction
of the noncompliant agent in case of rejection is a¤ = F
c
(1¡ P ) :
Some remarks are in order. Let us focus our attention on the internal equilibrium
¯rst (case 1). Here, F is large enough to exert some deterrence on the opportunistic
agent (¯¤ < 1) : At the equilibrium, the opportunist defects with a probability ¯ =
1
1¡p
1¡(1¡¿)2
1+(1¡¿)2 which is increasing in the investigation cost c and the private bene¯t T;
and decreasing in the penalty F; the indictment rate ¼ and the probability of ethical
behaviour p: The optimal settlement amount is such that the private bene¯t from
noncompliance is fully expropriated (in expected terms) from the agent; ¼q = T: The
settlement amount is larger if the private bene¯t from noncompliance is larger and
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if the probability of indictment is smaller. The probability of a settlement (upon
indictment) is
Pr (sett.) = x¤ (1¡ ½¤) = ¿
2
1 + (1¡ ¿ )2 ;
which is larger if F; ¼ and p are smaller, and c and T larger. An increase in the
penalty reduces the defection rate and undermines the credibility of the conviction
threat. As a result, the probability of a settlement is reduced. Finally, the probability
that a non-complaint agent is convicted is q¤=F = T
¼F
; which is smaller if the penalty
is larger.
Since it will become relevant for the determination of the optimal penalty, note
that an increase in the penalty induces a reduction in the noncompliance level, an
increase in the probability of a settlement and a reduction in the conviction rate.
When the penalty is set at low levels (case 2), the enforcement policy cannot exert
any deterrence on the opportunistic agent. The solution is on the corner, ¯¤ = 1;
and q = F
2
c
(1¡ P ) : Here, an increase in the pro¯tability of the investigation (larger
F; smaller c or smaller p) weakens the credibility constraint on the conviction threat
and allows the enforcer to demand a larger settlement amount.
It is interesting to calculate the probability of a settlement for two limit cases;
limF!1 Pr (sett.) = lim¿!0
³
¿2
1+(1¡¿)2
´
= 0;
limF!0 Pr (sett.) = (1¡ p)
³
1¡ 2P
1+P
´
= (1¡P )
2
1+P 2
:
For F ! 1; the opportunistic agent defects with a probability close to 0. The
optimal settlement o®er has q ! 0 since thorough investigations are not credible.
This o®er is rejected with probability one by the agent irrespective of whether he is
guilty or innocent.
For F ! 0; the problem of the enforcer is somehow reversed; he cannot threaten
thorough investigations because the penalty is in¯nitesimal. The optimal settlement
o®er has q ! 0 and the opportunistic agent is noncompliant with probability one.
This o®er is rejected with certainty by the honest agent and is rejected with posi-
tive probability by the opportunistic agent, who mimics the honest one. As p ! 0;
the opportunist has no honest agent to mimic and accepts the settlement o®er with
probability one.
On the basis of our results, we can now calculate the equilibrium net recovery.
We have
R (F ) =
8>>>><
>>>:
T
¼
¿
1 + (1 ¡ ¿ )2 ; for ¿ · 1¡ P (large penalty);
F 2
c
(1¡ P )2
1 + P 2
; for ¿ > 1¡ P (small penalty):
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The net recovery at the internal equilibrium ( ¿ · 1 ¡ P ) is decreasing in F and ¼;
and is increasing in T and c: This because variations in the parameters that make the
investigation more pro¯table (for a given defection probability) reduce the credibility
constraint on the conviction threat and increase the deterrent e®ect of the enforcement
process. The defection probability is consequently smaller, and so is the net recovery.
It is clear that if it were net recovery what the principal was interested in rather than
social loss, a large penalty level would not be desirable, since it would reduce the net
recovery to zero; limF!1 R (F ) = lim¿!0 R (F ) = 0:
For ¿ > 1¡P , the opportunistic agent defects with probability one. Variations in
the parameters do not a®ect the deterrent capacity (or better, the lack of it) of the
enforcement process. Therefore, the e®ect of an increase in the pro¯tability of the
investigation is to increase the net recovery.
Note that the expected recovery from the investigation reaches its maximum level
when ¿ = 1 ¡ P; i.e. when F is set to the largest level compatible with ¯ = 1: Here
the opportunistic agent defects with probability one and faces, in case of indictment,
a settlement demand q = F
2
c
¿ = T
¼
; which he accepts with probability 1 ¡ ½ = 1¡P
1+P
:
The expected recovery for the enforcer is R = F
2
c
(1¡P )2
1+P 2
: Suppose now that p = 0; i.e.
that the agent is an opportunist with probability one, and that ¿ = 1. In this case,
the enforcer does not su®er from imperfect information at the settlement stage since
the agent is guilty for sure, and there is no credibility constraint on the conviction
threat. The enforcer can then extract at no cost from the agent an amount which is
equal (in expected terms) to his private bene¯t from noncompliance: ¼R = F
2
c
= T:
If the penalty were increased, the agent would elect to be compliant with a positive
probability, creating uncertainty on the side of the enforcer. The investigation costs,
in turn, would raise by an amount more than proportional to the probability of com-
pliance. In fact, the guilty agent would now have an incentive to mimic the innocent
one and reject the settlement o®er with positive probability. The overall e®ect would
be an increase in the investigation costs and a sharp reduction in the net recovery.
This is an interesting result which shows that the largest expected net recovery is
obtained by limiting the punishment power of the enforcer, so as to minimize her
lack of information at the settlement stage and to soften the credibility constraint on
the conviction threat.
For an assessment of the overall e®ects of pre-investigation negotiations and for
the determination of the optimal penalty, we consider now the social loss associated
with the production of crime.
3. The optimal penalty
The results of the last section make clear that the social desirability of high penalties
cannot be reconciled with large levels of the net recovery. High penalties are instead
better considered in relation to their deterrent e®ect on criminal activity.
Let us consider the problem of the principal, i.e. of the authority that decides
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the level of the penalty. The principal chooses the level of the penalty taking into
account the e®ects that it will have on the process of enforcement and the level
of compliance. Following Reinganum (1993), we assume that the objective of the
principal is the minimization of the (uncompensated) social loss resulting from the
enforcement activity, measured as the di®erence between the expected harm produced
by the o®ender and the expected amount of resources recovered by the enforcer. The
level of harm associated with noncompliance is denominated in terms of social utility
and is equal to H:6
The social loss can then be expressed as
L (F ) = (1 ¡ p)¯¤H ¡ ¼R¤; (4)
where (1¡ p) ¯¤ is the equilibrium noncompliance probability and ¼R¤ the equilib-
rium expected net recovery.
We have
L (F ) =
8>>>><
>>>:
(1¡ p)H ¡ ¼F
2
c
(1 ¡ P )2
1 + P 2
; for ¿ > 1¡ P (small penalty);
1 ¡ (1¡ ¿ )2
1 + (1 ¡ ¿)2H ¡
¿
1 + (1¡ ¿ )2T; for ¿ · 1¡ P (large penalty):
(5)
For ¿ > 1 ¡ P; i.e. for F < F^ ´
q
Tc
¼(1¡P ); the opportunistic agent is noncompliant
with probability one. Here, an increase in the penalty a®ects only the expected net
recovery from the investigation and provides the enforcer with an incentive to devote
more e®ort to the case. The net recovery is larger and the social loss smaller if the
penalty is larger.
For ¿ = 1 ¡ P; we have L
³
F^
´
= (1¡ p)H ¡ 1¡P
1+P 2
T: Note that L
³
F^
´
¸ 0 if and
only if the social harm H associated with noncompliance is greater than 1
1¡p
1¡P
1+P 2
T =
1
1+P
T:7 For p ! 0; L
³
F^
´
= H ¡ T; which is positive only if the level of harm is
greater than the private bene¯t from noncompliance.
For ¿ · 1 ¡ P; i.e. for F > F^ , an increase in ¿ (i.e. either a reduction in F and
¼ or an increase in c and T ) has two e®ects; it raises the probability that harm is
produced and increases the amount of resources recovered through the enforcement
system. These e®ects clearly pull in opposite directions for the social loss. We have
@L
@F
< 0 () H > 2¡ ¿
2
4 (1 ¡ ¿ )T: (6)
6Note that if the victim of crime and the enforcement agency do not coincide (they do coincide,
for example, when the crime at hand is tax evasion) and if direct compensation (in expected terms)
does not take place, then the enforcement process produces a transfer of `welfare' from the victim of
crime to the enforcer. The more undesirable this transfer (because of lack of indirect compensation),
the larger will be the social harm H associated with crime.
7The last inequality stems from the fact that p = 2P
1+P 2
:
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An increase in the penalty level reduces the social loss (at the internal equilibrium)
if and only if H is su±ciently large. Note that the coe±cient of T in the previous
inequality is strictly increasing in ¿: For ¿ ! 0 (in¯nite penalty), we have L0 < 0 if and
only if H > 1=2 T: For ¿ ! 1¡ P , we have L0 < 0 if and only if H >
³
1
2
+ (1¡P )
2
4P
´
T:
If the probability of ethical behavior is negligible, p ! 0; then the latter condition
cannot be satis¯ed since limp!0
³
1
2
+ (1¡P )
2
4P
´
= 1: As expected, limF!1 L (F ) =
lim¿!0 L (F ) = 0: Therefore, F^ is a local minimum of L (F ) if H ·
³
1
2
+ 1¡P
2
4P
´
T;
and is a global minimum if H < 1
1+P
T:
Figure 3 plots the loss function for the case with no ethical behaviour (p = 0) :
Figure 3: Social loss as a function of the penalty level.
Let us focus on ¯gure 3 and consider how a variation in the penalty a®ects social
loss when p = 0. For small levels of the penalty, F < F^ =
q
cT=¼; the agent
is noncompliant with probability one. The enforcer enjoys full information at the
settlement stage and his o®er is accepted with certainty. An increase in the penalty
decreases the social loss since it increases the settlement amount without a®ecting
the probability of a settlement. At F = F^ ; the settlement amount is equal to T=¼
and the agent is fully expropriated from his private bene¯t from noncompliance. The
settlement o®er is accepted with certainty and no investigation costs are incurred in
by the enforcer. For penalty levels greater than F^ ; the credibility constraint on the
conviction threat starts to bite. When F is greater than F^ ; but less than a threshold
level ~F ; social loss is strictly increasing in the penalty; an increase in F reduces the
noncompliance probability and tightens the credibility constraint. The guilty agent
¯nds it more pro¯table to mimic the innocent one and the settlement o®er is more
likely to be rejected. Due to the larger probability of a (costly) investigation, the
net recovery is smaller and the social loss is larger. For F > ~F; the increase in the
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rejection probability associated with an increase in the penalty is outweighed by the
increase in the probability of harm, and social loss is decreasing with F: If the penalty
is in¯nite, no harm is committed, and the net recovery and the social loss are nil.
The special case just considered, with p = 0, displays two interesting properties.
The ¯rst is that when the penalty is set to F^ ; social loss is equal to H ¡ T; i.e.
social harm minus private bene¯t from noncompliance. In this case, a settlement is
reached with certainty and the enforcer can extract from the noncompliant agent
his private bene¯t in full at zero cost. The second is that social loss is strictly
increasing in the penalty for some values of F: Here, an increase in the penalty
level is detrimental, since it worsen the credibility constraint on the conviction threat
and increases the probability of a (costly) investigation. These facts have straight
consequences in terms of the optimal penalty. First, obviously, if the level of harm
associated with noncompliance is less than the private bene¯t to the agent, then social
loss is minimized at F = F^ : Second, if the penalty is constrained by an exogenous
upper bound ¹F 2
³
F^ ; ~F
´
, which may for instance derive from the limited liability of
the agent, then the optimal penalty is F^ : When F = F^ ; the enforcer \sells the shop"
to the agent, who buys the \right to be noncompliant" at an (expected) price equal to
his private bene¯t from it. The settlement e®ectively serves the purpose of legalising
the harmful act, taxing individuals by an amount equal to their private bene¯t from
the harmful activity.8 The interesting fact is that the enforcement system can be used
to extract the private bene¯ts from individuals at no costs only if two conditions are
satis¯ed: i) the penalty is small, and ii) all individuals are interested in buying the
right to be noncompliant (i.e. there are no ethical agents).
When p 6= 0; the previous results have to be quali¯ed. The presence of uncon-
ditionally compliant agents reduces the likelihood of a cost-free conclusion of the
enforcement process, since they will always refuse to settle. In turn, this leads non-
compliant agents to mimic the innocent ones and reject the settlement o®er with
positive probability. This means that there are no ways for the enforcer to avoid
the investigation costs and to recover T without e®ort. At F = F^ ; the probability
that a settlement is agreed upon indictment reaches its largest level and is equal to
(1¡P )2
1+P
: The probability that a costly investigation is carried out and the social loss
will therefore be larger if p is larger. Note also that in proximity of F = F^+; we have
L0 > 0 if and only if H <
³
1
2
+ (1¡P )
2
4P
´
T . This means that when p 6= 0; F = ~F is
local minimum only if H is su±ciently small. Actually, H has to be smaller if p is
larger.
The previous arguments suggest that the optimal penalty will depend on the ratio
between H and T:9
8Note that this argumet in favour of legalisation is slightly di®erent from the standard utilitarian
one (which says that an harmful act should not be deterred if the utility that the agent can get from
it is larger that the level of harm it produces), since our loss function does not include the violator's
utility. See Lewin and Trumbull (1990) for a philosophical defence of this approach.
9In the appendix, we will show that similar threshold levels can be de¯ned also for the case in
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Proposition 3. The optimal penalty
There are two threshold values h0 ´ 11+P and h1 ´
³
1
2
+ 1¡P
2
4P
´
such that:
1. If the ratio between the level of harm and the private bene¯t from noncompliance
is less than h0; then the optimal penalty is ¯nite, F
¤ = F^ :
2. If the ratio between the level of harm and the private bene¯t from noncompliance
lies between h0 and h1; then an in¯nite penalty is globally optimal and F = F^ is a
local optimum;
3. If the ratio between the level of harm and the private bene¯t from noncompliance
is greater than h1; then the social loss is monotonically decreasing with F and the
optimal penalty is in¯nite.
It may be useful to recall that F^ =
q
cT
¼
1
1¡P is the largest penalty compatible with
full noncompliance of the opportunistic agent.
When H=T is small, the principal is better o® by inducing the opportunistic agent
to be noncompliant with probability one and allowing the enforcer to extract from
him (in expected terms) his private bene¯t T: This amount can in turn be used to
compensate the victim of crime. Note that only opportunistic agents engage in crime
and pay the settlement amount, and that the enforcement systems e®ectively screens
between the two types of agents (those who value noncompliance and those who do
not). This is actually its major advantage with respect to a policy which directly
legalises the harmful behaviour.
When the ratio between social harm and private bene¯t is larger than h0, but
less than the threshold h1; then the optimal penalty is in¯nite. However, if limited
liability applies and F is bounded above, it may still be optimal for the principal to
set F = F^ and maximize the probability of a settlement with the opportunistic agent.
Note that the threshold value h1=
³
1
2
+ 1¡P
2
4P
´
is decreasing with the probability of
ethical behaviour. As p tends to 0; h1 tends to in¯nity, and F^ is a local optimum for
any (¯nite) level of H=T:
Finally, if the ratio between harm and private bene¯t is very large, H=T > h1;
then deterrence becomes more important, and the penalty has to be set to its largest
feasible level.
It is interesting to contrast these results with those deriving from the standard
enforcement model, in which no negotiations can take place between the enforcer
and the agent (see section 4). In the standard model, the Principle of Maximum
Deterrence applies and the optimal penalty is the largest feasible one, as far as social
harm is less than the net amount of resources that can be recovered from the agent.
Note that the latter amount consists of the penalty in°icted in case of conviction less
enforcement costs. When negotiations between the enforcer and the agent take place
and the penalty is small, instead, the recovery can take place at no cost, and the
condition for the optimality of an in¯nite penalty becomes more stringent. Also, if
limited liability puts an upper bound on F; then the optimal penalty may not be the
which the constraint \a · 1" is binding.
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maximal one.
Even in the case with no negotiations, before setting up an enforcement appara-
tus, the principal has to ask to herself whether enforcement is at all worthwhile, and
whether it would be better to legalise the o®ence at hand. Clearly, this is de¯nitively
a feasible alternative when all individuals enjoy a private bene¯t from noncompliance,
but is certainly more problematic when some individuals bene¯t from committing the
o®ense and others do not. One can hardly imagine an auction for the right to commit
criminal acts or engage in harmful behaviour. In fact, the easiest way to extract the
private bene¯t from the agents who gain from the harmful behaviour is to refrain
from setting a large penalty and allow for pre-trial negotiations. People who net a
large bene¯t from noncompliance will then engage in crime and pay it out at the
settlement stage. Agents who do not attach any value to noncompliance will instead
comply with the law and go through the normal enforcement procedure in case they
are (wrongfully) indicted. Clearly, this outcome is desirable only if the private bene¯t
from noncompliance to the agents is su±ciently greater than the social harm attached
to it and the legal system provides e®ective guarantees to innocent defendants.
In order to asses the overall e®ect of the settlement stage on the enforcement
policy, in the next section we investigate the features of the compliance game assuming
that negotiations between the enforcer and the agent cannot take place.
4. Negotiations versus straight investigations
One of the controversial issues in the theory of law enforcement and in general public
debates is whether negotiations between the enforcer and `suspected' o®enders should
be allowed to take place in the course of the enforcement process. The reason for
this is that the prospect of a negotiated penalty may provide agents with additional
incentives to engage in criminal activity. The increased noncompliance rate may then
partially or completely o®set the bene¯ts accruing from the reduction in enforcement
costs, which is provided by the introduction of the settlement stage.
In this section, we tackle this issue by comparing the equilibrium con¯guration
of the game in which negotiations take place between the enforcer and the indicted
agent with the equilibrium of a game in which negotiations are ruled out. We assume
that the penalty level is given. For sake of simplicity, we limit our analysis to the case
in which the probability of ethical behaviour is negligible, p = 0, and the enforcement
costs are su±ciently large to rule out equilibria with perfect investigations, c > T=¼.10
Let us consider the case in which pre-investigation negotiations are not feasible.
The enforcement game has a very simple structure; the agent chooses whether to
comply or not, and the enforcer what level of e®ort to devote to the investigation.
This model captures the typical situation in which noncompliance occurs only if the
10When c < T=¼; at the equilibrium we have ¯ = 1 and a = 1 for F 2 [c; T=¼] : For F belonging to
this interval, the introduction of the settlement stage has no e®ect on the noncompliance probability
(which is constantly one) and brings enforcement costs down to zero.
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probability of conviction is su±ciently large, while the probability of conviction is
large only if there is a positive probability that the agent is guilty.
The best reply functions of the players can be easily derived. The agent chooses
to comply only if the prospective punishment is larger than his private bene¯t from
noncompliance; 8>>>><
>>>>:
¯I (a) = 1 if aI <
T
¼F
;
¯I (a) 2 [0; 1] if aI = T¼F ;
¯I (a) = 0 if aI >
T
¼F
:
(7)
The net recovery for the enforcer is
RI (aI j ¯I) = aI ¯I F ¡ 1
2
caI :
For any given ¯I ; the best reply for the enforcer is
aI (¯I) =
8><
>:
¯I
F
c
if ¯I
F
c
· 1
1 otherwise.
(8)
The optimal accuracy of the investigation is larger if the probability of unearthing an
infraction is larger and if the investigation costs are smaller.
The equilibrium of the game between the enforcer and the agent is derived from
the interception of the two best reply functions, eqs. (7) and (8) ; and is described
below. 8>>><
>>:
¯¤I = ¿; and a
¤
I =
T
¼F
; for ¿ · 1;
¯¤I = 1; and a
¤
I =
F
c
; for ¿ > 1:
For small investigation costs, ¿ = cT
¼F 2
· 1; the conviction rate is a¤I = T¼F and the
agent is noncompliant with probability ¯¤I = ¿: The defection probability is larger if
c and T are larger, and F and ¼ smaller. For large investigation costs, ¿ > 1; the
enforcer is not able to deter the agent; the optimal conviction rate is a¤I =
F
c
and the
agent is noncompliant with probability one.
It can be easily seen that the conviction probability in the game without nego-
tiations, a¤I ; is the same as that obtained in the game with negotiations, a
¤
N . This
is the unique conviction probability that fully expropriates the agent's bene¯t from
noncompliance. As far as the probability of noncompliance is concerned, one can
easily see that, for any penalty level, it is larger when negotiations are feasible;
¯¤N ¡ ¯¤I =
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)2
1 + (1¡ ¿ )2 ¡ ¿ =
(1¡ ¿ ) ¿ 2
1 + (1¡ ¿ )2 > 0:
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When negotiations between the enforcer and the agent can take place, a fraction of
guilty agents settles the penalty; this reduces the pro¯tability of the investigation
and lowers the investigative e®ort. As a consequence, the deterrent e®ect of the
investigations is decreased and noncompliance occurs with a larger probability.
At the equilibrium, the expected net recovery for the enforcer is
R¤I =
8>>><
>>>:
a¤I ¯
¤
I F ¡ 12c (a¤I)2 = ¿
1
2
T; for ¿ · 1;
a¤IF ¡ 12c (a¤I)2 =
1
2
F 2
c
; for ¿ > 1:
(9)
At the internal equilibrium, ¿ · 1; the expected net recovery is decreasing in F and
¼; and is increasing in T and c: Changes in these variables a®ect the probability of
noncompliance and, consequently, the probability that the penalty is recovered. At
the corner equilibrium, ¿ > 1; the agent defects with probability one; a larger F and
a smaller c increase the pro¯tability of the investigation and increase the net recovery.
The social loss in the game with no-negotiations is
L¤I =
8><
>:
¯¤I (H ¡ T ) + ¼ 12c (a¤I)2 ; for ¿ · 1;
H ¡ a¤IF + 12c (a¤I)2 ; for ¿ > 1;
(10)
that is
L¤I =
8><
>:
¿
³
H ¡ 1
2
T
´
; for ¿ · 1;
H ¡ 1
2
¼ F
2
c
; for ¿ > 1:
By looking at the social loss expression, we can see that here an in¯nite penalty is
optimal only if the level of harm, H; exceeds the net recovery, T=2: For small levels of
harm,H < T=2; the net recovery is larger than the level of harm and a ¯nite penalty is
optimal (F ¤ =
q
cT=¼). At the optimum, the agent is noncompliant with probability
one and faces an expected penalty equal to his private bene¯t. It is important to
note that in order to collect this amount, the principal has to expend resources on
the investigation process, since only a conviction can result in the application of the
penalty. This marks a major di®erence between the present model and that in the
previous section, since in the latter the full extraction of the private bene¯t could
be obtained with no cost (by a pure threat) when the penalty was optimally set.
Note, ¯nally, that when the optimal penalty is in¯nite (H > 1=2 T ) ; the Principle
of Maximum Deterrence applies: the principal is better o® setting F to its largest
feasible level. This because variations in F do not a®ect the likelihood of a cost-free
conviction (settlement) of the o®ender.
Finally, we can compare the social loss associated with the game without negotia-
tions (L¤I) with the social loss associated with the negotiation game (L
¤
N) : From eqs.
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(5) and (10), we have
L¤N ¡ L¤I =
8><
>:
(¯¤N ¡ ¯¤I ) (H ¡ T )¡ ¼ Pr (sett.) 12c (a¤)2 ; for ¿ · 1;
¡¼ 1
2
c (a¤)2 ; for ¿ > 1:
The introduction of the settlement stage increases the probability that the agent is
noncompliant and reduces the expected investigation costs by an amount proportional
to the probability that the settlement is accepted. The di®erence in the social loss
is then composed of two parts: i) the increase in the expected level of harm net of
the amount that can be recovered from the noncompliant agent, and ii) the reduction
in the enforcement costs. Clearly, when the penalty is so small that ¯ is constantly
equal to 1; the introduction of the negotiation stage does not a®ect the expected level
of harm, and the social loss in the negotiations regime is smaller by an amount equal
to the reduction in enforcement costs. When the equilibria of the games with and
without negotiations are internal, ¿ < 1, which of the e®ects is the dominant one
depends on the size of H compared with T: In particular, we have
L¤N ¡ L¤I · 0()
(1¡ ¿ ) ¿ 2
1 + (1 ¡ ¿)2H ¡
1
2
¿
³
1 ¡ (1¡ ¿ )2
´
1 + (1¡ ¿ )2 T · 0
() H < 1¡
1
2
¿
1¡ ¿ T:
(11)
The next proposition summarizes our ¯ndings.
Proposition 4. The optimality of the negotiation
The introduction of the settlement stage has two e®ects on the enforcement sys-
tem: i) it increases the probability that the agent is noncompliant, ii) it reduces the
expected investigation costs by an amount which is proportional to the probability
that a settlement is agreed upon.
Given a penalty level large enough to exert some deterrence on the agent (¿ < 1),
the introduction of the settlement stage is desirable if and only if the ratio between
social harm and private bene¯t from noncompliance is less than a cut-o® value ¹h (¿) ´
1 ¡ 1
2
¿
1 ¡ ¿ :
Note that the threshold ¹h is increasing in ¿; and is therefore decreasing in ¼ and F;
and increasing in T and c: For ¿ ! 1 (small penalty), the condition for the desirability
of the negotiation stage collapses to H=T < 1; while for ¿ ! 0 (in¯nite penalty),
this condition collapses to H=T < 1.11
11By comparison of eqs.(6) and (11), one may note that if the social loss (with negotiations) is
increasing in the penalty, then the removal of the negotiation stage is de¯nitely detrimental (while
the reverse is not necessarily true).
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Given H and T; with H > T; we have
L¤N ¡ L¤I · 0, ¿ ¸
H ¡ T
H ¡ 1
2
T
:
The last result can be rephrased as follows.
Corollary 5. Given the level of the social harm H and the private bene¯t from
noncompliance T; with H > T; the introduction of the settlement stage reduces the
social loss if and only if the penalty level is su±ciently small.
When the penalty level is large, the agent is noncompliant with a small probabil-
ity and the possibility to reach a settlement is hampered by the credibility constraint
hanging over the conviction threat. This reduces the bene¯ts from the negotiation.
On the contrary, when the penalty is small, the agent is noncompliant with a large
probability: he will ¯nd it hard to pretend that he is innocent and will accept the
settlement o®er with a large probability. The reduction in the enforcement cost will
then outweigh the increase in the expected level of harm.
One may wonder how a positive probability of ethical behaviour would a®ect our
results. It can be easily seen that if the equilibrium is internal both with and without
negotiations, then equation (11) still holds. Hence, the introduction of the negotiation
stage is still desirable only if the penalty is su±ciently small. If the equilibria are on
the corner, then the introduction of the negotiation stage does not a®ect the expected
level of harm and yields a net reduction in the social loss.
5. Extensions
In this section we look as some ways of extending the model with pre-investigation
negotiations and show how some of its limitations can be overcome.
Selective indictment
The analysis of the previous sections has been carried out under the assumption
that the probability of indictment was the same irrespective of whether the crime had
been committed or not. We intend now to show how our results can be generalized
to the case in which the probability of an investigation depends on the compliance
choice of the agent.
Let us assume that by not complying the agent increases the probability of the
signal s that triggers the investigation. Let ¼n and ¼c be the probabilities that this
signal occurs when the agent is, respectively, noncompliant and compliant, and let
¼n > ¼c: One can calculate the probability that the agent is noncompliant when the
signal is observed. If x is the (prior) probability of noncompliance, we have
x^ ´ Pr (noncomplianace j s) = Á (x) ´ ¼n x
¼n x+ ¼c (1 ¡ x) :
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Since the indictment process is biased against the noncompliant agent, we have x^ > x
for all x 6= 0; 1:
Once an agent has been indicted, the case can be settled before the investigation
is started. The problem is the same as that analysed in section 2; the only di®erence
is that the belief of the enforcer about the probability of noncompliance is now x^
instead of x: The optimal settlement o®er is hence that, which is described in section
2. Since x^ is generally greater than x; the optimal settlement amount will be larger:
the selection bias of the indictment stage makes the conviction threat more credible.
From an ex-ante perspective, the fact that noncompliance increases the chances of
being indicted decreases the incentive to defect. An opportunistic agent will comply
only if
¼n q (x^) · T:
The noncompliant agent faces now a larger probability of indictment and a tougher
enforcer. At the equilibrium (which we assume for simplicity to be internal), the
expected payment must equate the private bene¯t from defection, so that q (x^) =
T=¼n:We have therefore x^ = q¡1 (T=¼n) and x^ = Á (x) ; so that x = Á¡1 (q¡1 (T=¼n)).
Given ¼n; the equilibrium probability of noncompliance is smaller if the indictment
process is more selective, i.e. if the probability of indictment of the compliant type
is smaller.
The social loss associated with the enforcement process can be easily derived.
Recall that L is the di®erence between expected harm and expected net recovery.
Once investigations are started, net recovery is as in section 2, with x^ in place of x:
The expected probability of an investigation is ¼ (x) = ¼c (1 ¡ x) + ¼nx: Thus, the
social loss becomes
L (x) = xH ¡ ¼ (x) R (x^) :
An improvement in the selectivity of the indictment process leads to a reduced level of
expected harm (since defection is more easily detected), a smaller probability that the
investigation is undertaken (since defection takes place with a smaller probability),
and to a larger net recovery if the investigation is carried out (since the probability
of noncompliance given indictment is larger, and the credibility problem is relaxed).
Since x^ = x at x = 0, 1; the results on the optimality of a ¯nite penalty for p = 0
are con¯rmed. In general, for p > 0; the results obtained with a constant probability
of indictment have to be adjusted so as to take into account the degree of selectiv-
ity in the indictment process. Their qualitative features, however, remain unchanged.
Variable private bene¯t from noncompliance
In many situations the private bene¯t from noncompliance is not known with cer-
tainty by the principal, since it may vary from individual to individual. We model this
lack of information by assuming that the principal and the enforcer share a common
prior on T; represented by a cumulative probability distribution G (T ) with supporth
0; ¹T
i
and G0 > 0 throughout: Since honest agents do not attach any (positive) value
to noncompliance, their private gain is T = 0:
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We analyze the nature of the equilibrium of the game starting from the settlement
stage. Let us assume that the probability of noncompliance x (T ) for each type-T
and the settlement amount q are given. The agent has to decide whether to accept
the o®er, and the enforcer what level of e®ort to devote to the investigation in case
of rejection. As in section 2.1, a noncompliant agent will choose to reject the o®er if
the expected conviction probability is su±ciently low,
½ (T ) = 1 if a <
q
F
:
Note that the probability of rejection is independent of T: For simplicity, we can
focus on a symmetric equilibrium, in which all noncompliant agents choose the same
½: Naturally, compliant agents reject the o®er with probability one.
The enforcer will choose the conviction probability that maximizes the expected
net recovery. In order to do so, it has to calculate the probability that the agent is
guilty, which is
X =
Z ¹T
0
x (T ) dG (T ) :
If we concentrate on the internal solution, we get
a (½ j X) = X½
X½+ 1 ¡X
F
c
;
which is the same as the expression obtained in section 2. It is then clear that the
equilibrium of the settlement stage coincides with the equilibrium derived in that
section, to which the reader may refer for details of the analysis. The best reply of
the enforcer, q (X) ; is also described there. In order to derive the equilibrium of the
whole game, we have to calculate the agent's optimal compliance decision. Given an
expected settlement amount q; the agent will defect if his gain from noncompliance
is su±ciently high;
x (T ) = 1 only if T ¸ ¼q:
The overall probability of defection is therefore equal to the probability that T > ¼q;
X = 1¡G (¼q) :
Note that X is a decreasing function of q:
The equilibrium of the game is unique and is characterized by
X¤I = 1¡G (¼q (X¤I )) :
At the equilibrium, the agent defects only if his bene¯t from noncompliance is larger
than the equilibrium expected settlement amount ¼q: At the settlement stage, a non-
compliant agent rejects the o®er with probability ½ = ½ (X), and the conviction rate is
a = a (X) (see the proposition on the optimal settlement o®er in section 2). Clearly,
the probability of a settlement is larger if the probability of noncompliance is larger.
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This indicates that an increase in the penalty level still has two e®ects: on one hand,
it reduces the expected level of harm; on the other, it increases the probability that
the settlement o®er is rejected. Also in this case, it may be optimal for the principal
to lower the penalty in order to induce a larger probability of noncompliance and
increase the probability of a settlement.
Variable bene¯t and penalty
In this section, we introduce the possibility that the penalty depends on the
private bene¯t from noncompliance. The idea is that external circumstances allow
the individual to engage in criminal activities of various kinds, and that the penalty
is larger if the crime is more serious. The penalty is now represented by a function f
of the private gain T; F = f (T ) ; with f (0) = 0 and f 0 > 0: It can be easily shown
that the nature of the equilibrium essentially depends on the shape of the penalty
function. Suppose that the indictment and conviction probabilities are given. In this
case, an agent who can bene¯t from noncompliance by an amount T will engage in
crime only if
¼af (T ) < T:
If the penalty function is convex, only agents with a small T will defect; if the penalty
function is concave, only agents with a large T will defect. Therefore, depending on
the shape of the penalty function, opposite criminal patterns may emerge. In the
following, we assume that, because of reasons associated with limited liability, the
penalty function is concave and that when defection takes place, it is perpetrated by
individuals who get a large private bene¯t from it.
The purpose of this section is not to derive the explicit solution of the enforcement
game, but rather to illustrate the way in which the enforcement process screens among
di®erent agents. Let us consider the settlement stage ¯rst, and let the settlement
amount q and the probability of noncompliance of each type, x (T ) ; be given. Let
½ (T ) be the probability that type-T rejects the settlement o®er if he has not complied.
We have
½ (T j q) = 1 only if a f (T ) · q:
Let T1 (a) be the cut-o® level of T for the rejection of the o®er: f (T1) = q=a:
Noncompliant agents with T ¸ T1 (a) accept the settlement o®er, while noncompliant
agents with T < T1 (a) reject it.
The enforcer selects the conviction rate so as to maximize the expected net recov-
ery. An internal maximum is characterized by
a (½) =
R ¹T
0 [f (T ) =c] ½ (T j q) x (T ) dG (T )R ¹T
0 ½ (T j q) x (T ) dG (T ) +
R ¹T
0 ( 1¡ x (T )) dG (T )
:
The conviction rate is larger if the average penalty that can be recovered from those
who reject the settlement o®er is larger. Given the settlement amount q; the internal
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continuation equilibrium will be characterized by
a (q) =
R T1(a)
0 [f (T ) =c] x (T ) dG (T )R T1(a)
0 x (T ) dG (T ) +
R ¹T
0 ( 1¡ x (T )) dG (T )
:
At the equilibrium, the probability that the o®er is rejected and the probability of
conviction are larger if q is larger.
Given the nature of the continuation equilibrium, the optimal settlement amount
for the enforcer will depend positively on the expected penalty that can be recovered
from the agent. Given the expected settlement amount and the related conviction
probability, the agent will choose to defect if T > ¼ af (T ) : For each possible level
of a; there is a cut-o® level T0 such that agents with T > T0 defect, and agents with
T < T0 comply. The overall probability of defection is larger if the settlement amount
is larger. In particular, the expected penalty of the noncompliant agent is larger if q
and a are larger. Given these premises, the equilibrium of the game is simply obtained
form the intersection of the best reply functions of the enforcer and the agents.
At the equilibrium, the type space will be partitioned in three parts by the cut-o®
levels T0 and T1: Depending on his private gain form noncompliance, the agent will
adopt one of the following strategies:
1. if his private bene¯t is small, T < T0; he will elect to comply and reject the
settlement o®er in case of indictment;
2. if his private bene¯t is of intermediate size, T0 < T < T1; he will elect not to
comply and will reject the settlement o®er in case of indictment;
3. if his private bene¯t is large, T > T1; he will elect not to comply and will accept
the settlement o®er in case of indictment.
Note that the settlement acts as a screening device; from the pool of indicted agents,
it screens out those who have defected and deserve the largest penalties.
Figure 4 illustrates a typical partition of the type space.
Suppose for a moment that the depth of the investigation and the conviction
probability upon indictment were given (or credibly chosen in advance). Then, the
e®ect of the introduction of the settlement stage could be easily pinned down; the
settlement would act as a simple screening device separating large o®enders from small
ones. O®enders who voluntarily accept to pay the settlement amount are excluded
from the prosecution process, and the enforcement costs born by the agency are
reduced. This is the major insight of the early literature on plea bargaining (Grossman
and Katz 1983) and the principal/agent approach to law enforcement (Reinganum
and Wilde 1985, Kaplow and Shavell 1994). In the view of this paper, instead, the
introduction of a settlement stage a®ects the enforcement process in a deeper way.
By excluding the agents who deserve the largest penalties from the conviction process
and by cutting down the expected net recovery from the investigation, the settlement
Prosecutorial discretion and criminal deterrence 28
Figure 4: Equilbrium behaviour of the agent as a function of his bene¯t from non-
compliance.
stage reduces the incentives for the enforcer to put full e®ort to the conviction of guilty
o®enders. As a result, the conviction probability is lower and the noncompliance level
is boosted (in reference to ¯gure 4, T0 is shifted to the left).
From an ex-ante perspective, the desirability of a settlement stage will there-
fore depend on the relative weight of two countervailing factors: increased loss from
noncompliance and reduced enforcement costs, as we have seen in section 4. The
introduction of a negotiation stage is then desirable only when the social harm asso-
ciated with noncompliance is small, or when the private bene¯t is large and evenly
distributed among the population (the latter fact makes settlement more likely).
6. Final remarks
The model developed in this paper sheds some new light on the implications of ne-
gotiated law enforcement. The tenet of this paper is that the information conveyed
at the settlement stage can profoundly a®ect the incentives for the enforcer to search
for incriminatory evidence and reduces the deterrence capacity of the enforcement
system. At the same time, settlements represent an e®ective tool to reduce the en-
forcement costs after the infraction has been committed. Our results show that there
is a fundamental divergence between the ex-post goal of e±ciency (i.e. the need
to attain a cost-e®ective conviction process) and the ex-ante goal of deterrence (i.e.
the need to ensure credible sanctions for noncompliant agents). Ex-post e±ciency
is maximal when the enforcer can use settlements to screen among agents, inducing
the guilty to accept the o®er and the innocent to reject it. This is possible, however,
only when the enforcer can make credible threats, i.e. when he is convinced that the
agent is guilty with a large probability. As a result, the enforcement expenditure is
smaller when the probability of noncompliance is larger.
The solution of the e±ciency-deterrence tradeo® will generally depend on the
weight attached to these factors. In general, one may expect that settlements will be
more valuable when the enforcement system is overburdened and the crime rate is
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large.
7. Appendix
A. Optimal settlement amount for F > c.
We have to consider two cases.
1. For xF < c; then a (½ j q) < 1 for all x; and the equilibrium is described by eq.
(3) :
2. For xF ¸ c; then a (½ j q) < 1 if ½ < 1¡x
x
c
F¡c ; and a (½ j q) = 1 if ½ ¸ 1¡xx cF¡c :
The continuation equilibrium is:8>><
>>>:
a (q j x) = q
F
and ½ (q j x) = 1¡x
x
1
(Fc
F
q
¡1) ; if 0 < q < F;
a (q j x) = 1; and ½ (q j x) 2
·
(1¡x)
x
1
(Fc ¡1)
;1
¸
; if q = F;
a (q j x) = 1; and ½ (q j x) = 1; if q > F:
For q = F; the game admits of a multiplicity of continuation equilibria, characterized
by di®erent probabilities of rejection by the guilty type. Note that for q < F; the
continuation equilibrium is internal and is the same as in the case with xF < c: The
same applies to the continuation net recovery. Here, however, the boundary is met
at q = F; rather than q = xF 2=c:
The continuation net recovery is
8>><
>>>:
R (q j x) = x q + 1
2
(1 ¡ x)
µ
1 + 1
(Fc
F
q
¡1)
¶
c
³
q
F
´2
; for q < F;
R (q j x) 2
·
xF ¡ 1
2
c; xF + 1
2
(1 ¡ x)
µ
1 + 1
(Fc ¡1)
¶
c
¸
; for q = F;
R (q j x) = xF ¡ 1
2
c; for q > F:
Let q^ (x) ´ F 2
c
³
1 ¡
p
1¡xp
1+x
´
(the optimal settlement amount for the case with F < c).
Since the expression of the ¯rst line is increasing in q for q 2 (0; q^ (x)) ; and decreasing
in q for q 2
³
q^ (x) ; F
2
c
x
´
; the optimal settlement amount is q = F if F · q^ (x) ; and
q = q^ (x) if F > q^ (x) : In particular, we have F · q^ (x) ; if and only if
x ¸ ¹x ´ 1 ¡
³
F¡c
F
´2
1 +
³
F¡c
F
´2 :
It can be easily established that ¹x > c=F:
To sum up, we have proved what follows.
For x < ¹x; the continuation equilibrium is not a®ected by the constraint \a · 1; "
and the optimal settlement amount is q^ (x) :
For x > ¹x; the constraint \a · 1" is binding, and the optimal settlement amount
is F:
Prosecutorial discretion and criminal deterrence 30
B. Equilibrium of the game when \a · 1" is binding
³
c
1¡P <
T
¼
´
:
Let us recall that the optimal settlement o®er of the enforcer is q (¯) = F
2
c
µ
1 ¡
p
1¡(1¡p)¯p
1+(1¡p)¯
¶
for ¯ < 1
1¡p ¹x; and q (¯) = F for ¯ ¸ 11¡p ¹x: We consider the case in which q (1) = F
when F = T=¼; i.e. T
¼c
(1 ¡ P ) > 1: The best reply of the agent is8><
>:
¯ (q) = 0 if q > T=¼;
¯ (q) 2 (0; 1) if q = T=¼;
¯ (q) = 1 if q < T=¼:
The equilibrium of the game is therefore as follows.
1. If F · 1
1¡P c; then the opportunistic agent is noncompliant with probability
¯¤ = 1 and the enforcer asks for a settlement amount q¤ = F
2
c
(1 ¡ P ) : The compli-
ant agent rejects the settlement o®er with probability one, while the noncompliant
agent rejects it with probability ½¤ = 2P
1+P
. The probability of conviction of the
noncompliant agent in case of rejection is a¤ = F
c
(1 ¡ P ) :
2. If 1
1¡P c < F · T¼ ; then the opportunistic agent defects with probability ¯¤ = 1
and the inspector makes a settlement o®er with q¤ = F: This o®er is rejected with
probability one by the compliant agent and with probability ½¤ = p
1¡p
c
F¡c by the
noncompliant agent. The probability of conviction of the noncompliant agent in case
of rejection is a¤ = 1:
3. If F > T
¼
, the opportunistic agent is noncompliant with probability ¯¤ =
1
1¡p
1¡(1¡¿)2
1+(1¡¿)2 and the enforcer asks for a settlement amount q
¤ = T
¼
. The compliant
agent rejects the settlement o®er with probability one, while the noncompliant agent
rejects it with probability ½¤ = 1¡¿
1¡1=2 ¿ : The probability of conviction of the noncom-
pliant agent in case of rejection is a¤ = T
¼F
:
Note that the constraint \a · 1" is binding only for 1
1¡P c < F · T¼ . Here,
the opportunistic agent is noncompliant with probability one, and the enforcer can
credibly threaten a perfect investigation (a = 1) and demand a settlement amount
equal to the penalty, q = F: The noncompliant agent rejects the settlement o®er with
probability ½ = p
1¡p
c
F¡c ; which is larger if the investigation is more pro¯table.
The net revenue and the social loss function associated to the equilibrium of the
game are the same as those derived in section 2 expect for 1
1¡P c < F · T¼ ; where we
have
R = (1 ¡ p)F ¡ 1
2
c p
F
F ¡ c;
and
L (F ) = (1¡ p) (H ¡ ¼F ) + ¼1
2
c p
F
F ¡ c:
Note that the settlement amount is larger and the enforcement costs are smaller if F
is larger. When there are no ethical agents, p = 0; the enforcer can extract from the
agent the penalty with no costs. At F = T=¼; we have L = H ¡ T:
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Figure 5 plots the social loss as a function of the penalty for the case with p = 0:
Figure 5: Social loss as a function of the penalty for the case in which \a · 1" is
binding.
Recall that the constraint \a · 1" is binding for F 2 [c; T=¼] : In this region, the
agent defects and accepts the settlement o®er with amount q = F with probability
one. An increase in the penalty increases the settlement amount without a®ecting
the credibility constraint, and reduces the social loss. For F = T=¼; the settlement
amount equals the private bene¯t from noncompliance; the game admits of a mul-
tiplicity of equilibria characterized by a defection probability ¯ 2 [c¼=T; 1] and a
rejection probability for the noncompliant type equal to ½ 2 [0; T¡c¼
T¡1=2 c¼ ]: The larger
the defection probability, the more likely it is that the settlement is accepted. For
(T=¼)¡ ; we have ¯ = 1 and L = H ¡ T: For F greater than T=¼; the constraint
\a · 1" is not binding, and the social loss is as in ¯gure 3.
We can now derive the optimal penalty. Recall that
L (F ) =
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
(1¡ p)H ¡ ¼F 2
c
(1¡P )2
1+P 2
; for F · c
1¡P ;
(1¡ p) (H ¡ ¼F ) + ¼ 1
2
c p F
F¡c ; for
c
1¡P < F <
T
¼
;
1¡ (1¡ ¿ )2
1 + (1¡ ¿ )2H ¡
¿
1 + (1 ¡ ¿ )2T; for
T
¼
< F:
For ¼F < T; we have L0 (F ) < 0; while for ¼F > T; we have L0 (F ) < 0 if and only if
condition (6) is satis¯ed. For ¼F = T; the game admits a multiplicity of equilibria;
the opportunistic agent is indi®erent on whether to defect with probability one and
reject the settlement o®er (of amount ¼F = T ) with probability ½ = p
1¡p
c
F¡c , or to
defect with probability ¯ = 1
1¡p
1¡(1¡¿)2
1+(1¡¿)2 and reject with probability ½ =
1¡¿
1¡1=2 ¿ . We
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have
L
³
T=¼¡
´
= (1 ¡ p) (H ¡ T ) + ¼1
2
cp
T=¼
T=¼ ¡ c
and
L
³
T=¼+
´
=
cT [H (2T ¡ c¼)¡ T 2]
T 2 + (T ¡ c¼)2 :
With a good deal of algebra, one can establish that
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
L (T=¼¡) · L (T=¼+)() H · T
2
2T¡c¼
T¡c¼ ;
L (T=¼¡) ¸ 0() H ¸ T
T¡c¼
³
T ¡ 2¡p
2¡2pc¼
´
;
L (T=¼+) · 0) L0 (T=¼+) ¸ 0;
[L0 (T=¼+) ¸ 0 _ L (T=¼¡) · 0]) L (T=¼¡) · L (T=¼+) :
Again, limF!1 L (F ) = 0: From the previous results one can infer that F = T=¼ is a
global minimum if and only if H=T · h0 ´ 1T¡c¼
³
T ¡ 2¡p
2¡2pc¼
´
and a local minimum
if and only if h0 < H=T · h1 ´ 12 2T¡c¼T¡c¼ :
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